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Abstract— The reliability of information in participatory
sensing (PS) systems largely depends on the accuracy of
the location of the participating users. However, existing PS
applications are not able to efficiently validate the position of
users in large-scale outdoor environments. In this paper, we
present an efficient and scalable Location Validation System
(LVS) to secure PS systems from location-spoofing attacks.
In particular, the user location is verified with the help of
mobile WiFi hot spots (MHSs), which are users activating
the WiFi hotspot capability of their smartphones and accept-
ing connections from nearby users, thereby validating their
position inside the sensing area. The system also comprises
a novel verification technique called Chains of Sight, which
tackles collusion-based attacks effectively. LVS also includes
a reputation-based algorithm that rules out sensing reports
of location-spoofing users. The feasibility and efficiency of
the WiFi-based approach of LVS is demonstrated by a set
of indoor and outdoor experiments conducted using off-
the-shelf smartphones, while the energy-efficiency of LVS is
demonstrated by experiments using the Power Monitor energy
tool. Finally, the security properties of LVS are analyzed by
simulation experiments. Results indicate that the proposed
LVS system is energy-efficient, applicable to most of the
practical PS scenarios, and efficiently secures existing PS
systems from location-spoofing attacks.
Index Terms—Participatory Sensing, Smartphones, Secu-
rity, WiFi Hotspots, Location Spoofing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Undoubtedly, smartphones have become one of the most
powerful and pervasive technologies today. Among all
features, the simplicity of use make smartphones ideally
suited for a novel and tremendously potential sensing
paradigm, known as participatory sensing (PS) [1]. The
basic idea behind PS is to allow ordinary citizens to
participate in large-scale sensing surveys with the help of
user-friendly applications installed in their smartphones.
This not only reduces dramatically deployment costs of
fixed infrastructures, but also provides fine-grained spatio-
temporal coverage of the sensing area. Significant research
and development from industry and academia has been
devoted to design PS systems improving life experience of
users. Indeed an abundance of real-life applications, which
take advantage of both low-level sensor data and high-
level user activities, range from real-time traffic monitor-
ing [2] [3] to air pollution or garbage monitoring [4]–[6]
F. Restuccia is with the Department of Electrical and Com-
puter Engineering, Northeastern University, Boston, MA (e-mail:
f.restuccia@northeastern.edu) ).
A. Saracino and F. Martinelli are with the Istituto di Informatica e
Telematica del Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Via G. Moruzzi n.1,
56124, Pisa, Italy (e-mail: {a.saracino, f.martinelli}@iit.cnr.it).
to social networking [7], to name a few. For a complete
survey of PS applications, the readers may refer to [8].
Above all features, the most innovative aspect of PS
systems is that they are infrastructure-free, and rely only on
the users’ active participation to gather reliable data about
the sensing area. Therefore, it becomes paramount to verify
with relative precision the current users’ location, since the
sensed data (e.g., temperature) is significantly dependent
on the spatial context. However, smartphone applications
(apps) like LocationHolic or FakeLocation make
extremely easy for users to spoof their current GPS lo-
cation. Such software provides users with easy-to-use in-
terfaces to manually set the global position system (GPS)
coordinates, thereby deceiving location-based apps running
on the device.
Fig. 1: Screenshot of Waze and FakeLocation apps.
A. Motivation
Large-scale LSAs have potentially devastating conse-
quences in terms of reliability and revenue loss of the
PS systems [9]–[13]. To motivate and demonstrate the
simplicity and impact of LSA, we considered the well-
known traffic monitoring application Waze, which is a
community-driven application gathering some complemen-
tary map data and other traffic information from users.
Similar to other location-based apps, Waze learns from
users’ driving times to provide routing and real-time traffic
updates. This application is free to download and use, and
people can report accidents, traffic jams, speed and police
traps, and can update roads, landmarks, house numbers,
and so on. Figure 1 depicts a screenshot of Waze and
FakeLocation apps. Waze has a point-based reputation
system based on the frequency of traffic reports and miles
driven1.
1https://www.waze.com/wiki/Your Rank and Points
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Fig. 2: Revenue given to attackers in [14].
In order to understand how much revenue the admin-
istration of the PS application may lose due to LSAs,
we implemented and simulated the reward mechanism
scheme due to Yang et. al (appeared in ACM MobiCom
2012 [14]). In particular, we focused our attention on the
Platform-Centric reward model, in which the users are paid
proportionally to the time tu they declare to dedicate to
the sensing services (see [14] for additional details). We
focused on this particular model because of its simplicity
and its strong game-theoretical properties. Figure 2 shows
the average percentage of revenue that attackers receive
from the reward mechanism at each time step with respect
to the total number of reward R offered at each sensing
request, as a function of the number of attackers and the
declared time ta that will be dedicated to the sensing task
(as multiple of tu = 1 time unit). Figure 2 concludes that
the amount of revenue the attackers steal from the reward
mechanism grows linearly with the number of attackers.
In order to have an idea of the impact of attackers in
term of revenue loss, let us suppose to have a percentage
of attackers equal to 5%, 1000 users in the system, R
equal to $10, ta equal to tu, and sensing requests every
minute. Every time the PS application requests data from
the users, the attackers steal $0.5 from the system, which
means in a day the attackers steal $720. In a month and
a year, respectively, the administration will lose $21,600
and $262,800, respectively. If the application requires data
every 10 minutes, the attackers would still steal $26,280 a
year.
B. Our contribution
The above examples demonstrate that LSAs tremen-
dously undermine the reliability and the revenue of existing
PS systems. However, given the extremely large scale
of real-world PS systems and the uncontrollable, random
mobility of smartphone users, verifying with relative accu-
racy the location of users becomes remarkably challenging.
LSAs are also extremely difficult to detect, given the
PS system has no means to find out whether users are
using apps such as FakeLocator. This issue calls for
a distributed solution which leverages the collective action
of participating users.
This paper makes the following novel contributions.
• We propose the Location Validation System (LVS),
which efficiently and effectively tackles LSA attacks.
LVS exploits the collaborative actions of users and
the WiFi capability of smartphones to validate the po-
sition of other users. In fact, two smartphones directly
connected through WiFi range are practically sharing
the same location, due to the limited WiFi range. In
such way, these two users can mutually validate their
locations inside the sensing area. By exploiting this
technique on a large scale, LVS implements an ef-
fective, scalable and distributed anti location-spoofing
system. A reputation-based algorithm is also proposed
to filter out reports coming from malicious users.
• We propose the novel Chain of Sights (CoS) verifica-
tion algorithm to contrast collusion-based attacks. CoS
give a representation of the history of the validation
process introduced through LVS. This process is based
only on feedbacks sent by users to the system and
does not rely on trusted control mechanisms. In fact,
such mechanisms open the possibility of smart attacks
based on colluding malicious users, which are part
of a more challenging threat model not considered in
former related work [15].
• The viability of the WiFi-based approach of LVS is
demonstrated by real experiments conducted using off-
the-shelf smartphones on indoor and outdoor testbeds.
The results show that the framework is effective both
in typical indoor environments, as well as in outdoor
environments with greater distances between the users
(up to 60m). We also measure the energy consumption
of the WiFi-based mechanism of LVS using the Power
Monitor [16] hardware tool. Results show that the
proposed approach has practically no overhead on the
smartphone resources in terms of energy consumption.
• The efficiency and effectiveness of the LVS framework
against location-spoofing attacks is proven through
simulations. Simulation results indicate that the frame-
work is resilient to high percentages of attackers (up
to 40%) and scales well with the number of users in
the system.
This paper largely extends the work presented in [17]
and [18], by introducing the concept of chain of sight, a
deeper security analysis, an energy performance evaluation
and formal demonstration of theorems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces preliminary concepts and formally defines the
notion of LSA attack, while Section V discusses the related
works. Section III describes in depth the proposed LVS
framework, while Section IV presents experimental and
simulation results of the LSA framework considering prac-
tical PS scenarios. Finally, Section VI draws conclusions
with directions of future work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first provide some technical back-
ground on PS and we define the threat model.
In this paper, we adopt the most common architecture for
PS system, which is based on a PS platform (PSP) hidden
inside a mobile cloud computing system [19]. Periodically,
users are requested by the PSP to submit their sensed data
to the PS system. At each request, users may choose to
participate by sending their data to the PSP, or may simply
ignore the request. The sensing app, which can be dis-
tributed through common application markets like Google
Play or App Store, is responsible for providing the users
a friendly interface for data visualization and acquisition,
as well as ensuring reliable data communication between
the users and PSP through cellular or WiFi network. After
operations such as data filtering and aggregation, global
information about the sensing area may be sent back to the
users through the PS application, so as to be used for their
daily activities.
As far as potential threats are concerned, we will assume
that the communication between the users and the PS
server runs is via reliable and protected wireless channel,
where data cannot be lost, eavesdropped, modified or sub-
stituted. We also assume the PS server is totally reliable
and trustworthy (root of trust), in particular, in terms of
user registration, key management, issuing credentials, trust
assessment and reputation management. Users are uniquely
identified inside the network through an identifier (ID)
which exploits a digest of the smartphone IMEI (Interna-
tional Mobile Equipment Identifier), which is unique for
any device worldwide. Moreover, trying to modify a device
IMEI (i.e., spoofing) is considered illegal and is extremely
more complex than spoofing the location [20]. Therefore,
given users cannot spoof their identity inside the systems,
we assume that sybil attacks are not possible.
Henceforth, we will focus our attention to solving the
attacks formalized in section III-E. In particular, attacks
via the communication channels (e.g., eavesdropping, traffic
jamming, etc.) are out of the scope of this paper.
III. LOCATION VALIDATION SYSTEM
In this section we describe the LVS security framework to
tackle the location-spoofing attack (LSA). We first describe
the system model and formalize the LSA attack under such
model. Next, we describe in details the algorithm used by
LVS to select the users acting as mobile hot-spots (MHS),
as well as the WiFi-based location validation algorithm of
LVS. Finally, we describe the reputation-based algorithm
used by LVS to filter out unreliable reports and therefore
guarantee reliability of the PS system.
A. System Model and Assumptions
Hereafter, we will suppose the smartphone sensing area
is logically divided into W location areas of size S × S,
in which N users can move without restrictions (we do not
assume any particular user mobility pattern and model).
Specifically, users are free to move from one location area
to another, and a given location area may contain any
number of users (from 0 to N ). However, users cannot be
in two different location areas at the same time. We assume
S and W are tuning parameters depending on the specific
PS application and its required accuracy of user location.
We assume the location area Ltk of user uk at time t is
identified by a pair of numerical coordinates representing a
point in the two-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system
C , {O,X ,Y}. We also assume that users are connected
to the Internet through WiFi or 3/4G Internet connection.
• LVS user module. It is implemented inside the sensing
app installed in the users’ smartphones, and is re-
sponsible for handling the communication (through the
Internet) between the PSP and the smartphone as far as
the operations performed by LVS are concerned. It also
handles the user WiFi hotspot activation as explained
in III-C.
• PSP communication module. This module is imple-
mented on the PSP, and is responsible for the commu-
nication (through the Internet) between the PSP and
the LVS user module.
• PSP computation module. It handles the computation
burden of LVS, which is the optimal selection of the
users (see III-D) that will run the location validation
algorithm (see III-C), as well as the computation of
the Chain of Sights (see III-F) and the calculation of
the reputation of the users (see III-G).
Internet
PSP
comm.
module
LVS
user
module
PSP
computation
module
User PSP
Fig. 3: Block diagram of LVS.
B. Overview of LVS
Figure 3 depicts the four logical components of LVS. Let
us describe the functionality of each module in detail.
• LVS user module. It is implemented inside the sensing
app installed in the users’ smartphones, and is re-
sponsible for handling the communication (through the
Internet) between the PSP and the smartphone as far as
the operations performed by LVS are concerned. It also
handles the user WiFi hotspot activation as explained
in III-C.
• PSP communication module. This module is imple-
mented on the PSP, and is responsible for the commu-
nication (through the Internet) between the PSP and
the LVS user module.
• PSP computation module. It handles the computation
burden of LVS, which is the optimal selection of the
users (see III-D) that will run the location validation
algorithm (see III-C), as well as the computation of
the Chain of Sights (see III-F) and the calculation of
the reputation of the users (see III-G).
C. Location Validation Algorithm
Before describing the LVS location validation algorithm,
let us define as mobile hot-spots (MHSs) the subset of
selected users (selection is explain in section III-D) who ac-
tivate the built-in WiFi hotspot feature of their smartphones
and wait for other users to connect. Users that reside in the
WiFi range of MHSs are called neighbors. The neighbors
and the MHS will mutually validate their locations.
The location validation algorithm divides time into val-
idation rounds, occurring every Tr time units; henceforth,
we will refer to tj = j · Tr as the time of the j-th
validation round. During a validation round, the MHSs
and their neighbors mutually validate their locations. A set
of consecutive validation rounds is called validation epoch
(Figure 4). The number of rounds composing a validation
epoch and hence, its duration Te, is variable and will be
detailed later in the subsection.
Tr
Te
t
Fig. 4: Validation epoch timeline.
Let N ji denote the number of users physically present in
the i-th location area i at time tj . Also, let D
tj
i define the
number of users advertising their position to be inside the
location area i at time tj . During every validation round,
the LVS validation algorithm performs the following three
steps.
S1. The user module transmits her current location Ltjk
to the PSP computation module through the PSP
communication module. For each location area, the
PSP selects a subset of users among Dtji users that
appear to be in the i-th location area (selection
algorithm described in Section III-D).
S2. The selected users receive a message request from
the PSP to act as MHS and validate the position
of their neighbors through WiFi connection. At the
same time, the neighbors also validate the position
of the MHS for additional security. This is when
the location validation takes place (details explained
below), which we call spotting for brevity.
S3. Each user transmits the location validation informa-
tion acquired in the current validation round to the
PSP through the LVS user module. This information
is used by the PSP computation module to compute
users’ reputation as detailed in sections III-F and
III-G.
Tr
Tsw Tvt
t
Fig. 5: Validation round timeline.
In detail, the operations performed by each user during
each validation round in step S2 are summarized as follows.
• Each MHS turns on the WiFi hotspot capability, and
after WiFi setup time Tsw (see Figure 5), starts ac-
cepting connections from nearby users for a maximum
validation time Tvt. Next,
– each user ui connected to MHS uj sends a
packet containing her unique ID number IDj to
uj (remember that IDs cannot be spoofed);
– MHS uj replies by sending a packet containing
IDj to every neighbor;
– after the reception of the packet from their MHS,
the neighbors disconnect from their MHS.
• After the validation time Tvt elapses, each MHS turns
off the WiFi connection (if not active before the
validation phase).
• Each user reports to the PSP the IDs of the users
verified in the current validation round (if any).
This operation of mutual validation between an MHS and a
user in its WiFi range is also called spotting. If the user ui
is an MHS and the user uj is in its WiFi area, we say that
ui spots uj and uj spots ui. As an illustrative example, let
us consider location area Ai containing four users A, B, C
and D at the validation round j (Figure 6.a). During this
round, the PSP chooses B to be MHS since she is close to
users A and C. Users A and C are within the WiFi range
of B, while D is in a different zone of Ai. Therefore, A
validates the location of B and C, while both B and C
validate the location of A. During round j+1 (Figure 6.b),
D and B validate the location of each other.
As mentioned earlier, the PSP evaluates the reputation of
each user once a validation epoch is finished. In particular,
a validation epoch ends when the position of all users in a
given location area has been validated by at least q users,
where q is a system parameter. More formally, the duration
of j-th validation epoch for location area Ai is defined
as min(eM , emax), where eM is the number of validation
rounds required to validate M% of the Dtji users by at least
q users, and emax is a system parameter.
Let us now discuss in details some aspects and advan-
tanges of the location validation algorithm of LVS.
B
A C
D A
C
B
D
(a) (b)
Fig. 6: Position of users at rounds j and j + 1.
• The operations performed by the LVS user module,
included the activation of the WiFi hotspot capability,
do not require manual activation by the user, but are
instead handled automatically by the PSP through the
user module of LVS. This allows the users to act as
MHS without manual intervention, easing the burden
on the users.
• Modern smartphones include functionalities enabling
at the same time WiFi and 3/4G connection2. In
particular, the functionality avoids disconnections if
the user is using the WiFi interface for Internet con-
nection when a validation round begins. Hence, before
the user WiFi is disconnected to become an MHS
or to connect to an MHS nearby, the connection is
migrated to mobile data (3G/4G) to ensure continuity.
This allows the location validation algorithm to run
without disrupting existing connections on the user
smartphone.
• The WiFi-based algorithm of LVS has the remarkable
advantage that neighbors and MHS will mutually au-
thenticate each other. This given additional security to
the system, as more location validation information is
available to the PSP to prevent LSAs.
• The cooperation of the user in acting as MHS can be
guaranteed by using efficient and effective incentive
mechanism, such as [14]. Therefore, the assumption
that enough users acting as MHSs will be available at
each validation round is sound.
D. Selection of MHSs
The selection of MHSs at each validation round
is an extremely important problem for the PS system
performance. An MHS should be chosen in such a way that
maximizes sensing area coverage and therefore, validates
as many users as possible at each validation round. In this
subsection, we define the problem of optimum selection
of MHSs at each validation round and prove that it is an
NP-Hard problem. In particular, we first select a minimum
set of users to act as MHSs such that every other user with
at least one neighbor may connect to at least one MHS.
Next, we present an approximation algorithm which yields
2Available at https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=it.opbyte.
superdownload
a suboptimal solution in polynomial time.
Problem 1 (P1). Let U j = {u1, ..., uN} the set of users
of the PS system at time tj having at least one neighbor
in the WiFi range. Given the position Ljk, 1 ≤ k ≤ N , of
every user uk at time tj , select a subset P j ⊆ U j to act
as MHSs such that (i) each user with at least one neighbor
can connect to at least one MHS, and (ii) |P j | is minimum.
Lemma 1: Problem 1 is NP-Hard. Proof shown in the
Appendix.
To solve P1, we use the greedy algorithm proposed
by Chvatal in [21]. The complexity of the algorithm is
O(|P j | log |P j |) with the best known sorting algorithm.
It can be proven [21] that this algorithm achieves an
approximation ratio of H(|P j |), where H(n) is the n-th
harmonic number, i.e., H(n) =
∑n
k=1
1
k < ln(n+ 1).
Proof: We prove the hardness of the problem by
reducing the optimization version of the set cover problem
(O-SCP), which is known to be NP-Hard, to P1. O-SCP
is stated as follows. Given a set X of elements (called the
universe), and a set S of n subsets whose union equals
the universe, identify the smallest subset of S whose union
equals the universe. By defining V j = X , and Zj = X ,
a set cover for X is a solution Qj to P2, and viceversa.
Therefore, O-SCP ≤P P1, which means P1 is NP-Hard.
E. Attacks Formalization
After defining the main components of LVS, it is possible
to extend the threat model formally defining two attacks in
addition to the LSA, formally redefined here for the sake
of readability:
• Location Spoofing Attack. Let a PS system have N
active users U j = {u1, . . . , uN} at time tj and W
location areas A = {A1, ..., AW }. A location-spoofing
attack (LSA) is performed when one or more users
us (called spoofers) belonging to the set Us ⊆ U j
advertise to the PSP a position (fake position) in a
location area Afl (fake location area), while their real
location is in the location area Arl (real location area),
where Afl 6= Arl . The location in Afl is provided
continuously by the spoofer. We assume that during
the attack, spoofers can move from one location area
into another, but the condition Afl = A
r
l is never met.
• Collusion Attack. The collusion attack is performed
when one or more sets of users Uc = {u1, . . . , uc}
perform an LSA providing the location Ak when they
are in location areas different from Ak, and at each
validation round each user in Uc validate the fake
position in Ak of all other users in Uc. This attack
can represent a situation in which a group of users
is expected to be in a specific place, while they all
are in different places. Thus, they collude mutually
validating the fake position.
• Fraud Covering Attack. In the fraud covering attack a
user um performs an LSA providing a position in Aj ,
but being located in Ak. At the same time, another
user uf effectively residing in Aj validates at each
validation round the position of um in Aj . With this
attack, a user can be located in a low density area, in
order not to be spotted by other nodes residing in Ak
and pretending to provide information on a different
area.
F. Chains of Sights
Chains of Sight (CoS) represent the situation of a lo-
cation area describing the series of direct and indirect
spotting between users in a validation epoch. The CoSs
have been designed to improve the performance of LVS
and to effectively tackle the Collusion and Fraud Covering
attack described formerly. During each validation epoch,
each user keeps track of the users spotted in the various
rounds and shares this knowledge with the users spotted in
the following rounds. As an example, if the user ui spotted
the user uj in the round r, when at the round r+1 is spotted
by the user uk, ui will tell to uk about the presence of uj
in the area. Thus uk indirectly spots uj and also validates
the uj position. This information is expressed through a
CoS in the following form: uj → ui/uk, read as “uj sees
uk through ui”. It stems that through CoSs it is possible
to reduce the number of validation round per epoch. A
CoS has two main elements: the spotted node, which is
the user identifier on the right end of the chain and the
length which is the number of users in the chain. Notice
that the chain length cannot be greater than ψmax. At the
end of each validation round the collection of CoS stored by
a user ui is defined as user area knowledge Ωui , while the
collection of all user area knowledges compose the global
area knowledge.
Formally the CoSs are generated according to the fol-
lowing algorithm;
1) At each sensing round, the MHSs send their current
area knowledge to the spotted users.
2) Spotted users send their current area knowledge only
to their hot spot.
3) Each user Ul, including hot spots, update its area
knowledge Ωl with the useful information from the
received area knowledge(s), called Ωr, exploiting the
following algorithm:
Algorithm 1 Updating Ωl
for all γi in Ωr do
if γi not in Ωl then
Ωl = Ωl ∪ γi
end if
end for
In Figure 7 it is reported an example of validation epoch
composed of four rounds in a specific location area, where
a fraud covering attack is being performed. We will use
this example to give a better understanding of the CoS
algorithm. The user C is located in a different location area
and colludes with B who will always validate the position
of C in the area of Figure 7. In the first validation round the
users B and E are selected as MHS. Thus, B validates the
position of D who is nearby and maliciously also validates
the position of C, whilst E validates the position of F . We
recall that the authentication is mutual, thus D and C will
also validate the location of B, while F will validate the
location of E. The area knowledge will be the following:
ΩA = ∅, ΩB = {B → C;B → D}
ΩC = {C → B}, ΩD = {D → B}
ΩE = {E → F} ΩF = {F → E}
In the second round B is spotted by the MHS F and in the
information exchange will tell that he spotted D and C in
the former round. Thus, the knowledge of F at the end of
the second round will be:
ΩF = {F → E F → D;F → B,F → B/C}
A
C
B
D
E
F B
A C
D
E
F
A
B
C
D
E
F
A
B
C
D
E
F
(Round 1) (Round 2)
(Round 3) (Round 4)
Normal User SpooferMHS Colluder
Fig. 7: Example of fraud covering.
For the sake of brevity we omit the knowledges of other
users. In the third validation round, the user C (spoofer) is
selected as MHS together with A. C validates the position
of B and no one else, since cannot see anyone in the area.
In the forth round B is chosen again as hot spot, together
with D, and B will validate again the position of D. The
area knowledge of the various users at the end of round four
is represented with a shortened notation in the following:
ΩA = {A→ {B,E, F};A→ B/D;A→ B/C}
ΩB = {B → {A,C,D,E, F}}
ΩC = {C → B;C → B{D,E, F}}
ΩD = {D → {B,F};D → F/E}
ΩE = {E → {A,B, F};E → B/{C,D}}
ΩF = {F → {A,B,D,E}, F → B/C}
At the end of the fourth validation round, each user has been
spotted by at least four other users (80%). However, the
presence of C is validated directly only from B. Analyzing
the CoSs it is easy to see that all other users validate the
presence of C indirectly, from the information received
from B. It is unlikely that no other users directly validate
C, thus, as formalized in the following, if this suspicious
situation is repeated for a specific number of rounds, C is
considered a spoofer and B a colluder.
Chains of sight are effective in contrasting the Collusion
and Fraud Covering attack. In the collusion attack all the
colluding users will provide to the system chains of sight
where each user in the chain of sight belongs to the set
UC of the colluding users. Assuming that the number of
colluding users is lower than the average length of a CoS,
for finding colluding users is sufficient to find CoSs that
reports a set of users US that are never spotted, directly or
indirectly by users outside from this set. Formally, calling
Ωuk the list of CoS owned by the user uk at a validation
epoch, a collusion attack is detected if
∀{us ∈ US , uk ∈ UK} Ωus ∩ Ωuk = ∅
where UK is the set of all users declaring their position in
the location area that are not part of US , i.e. US ∩UK = ∅.
In such a case, all users in US are deemed as malicious
after the threshold of θc validation epochs.
Chains of sight also allow to tackle the Fraud Covering
Attack formerly described. In fact, the fake location of the
user um is only validated by the user uf . Thus, every chain
of sight that validates the position of um will have the
following two possible formats:
ui → uj/ . . . /uf/um
uf → um
(1)
Given a threshold θf , if for a number of validation epochs
greater than θf all chains validating the position of um are
in the formats of Eq. 1, um and uf are deemed as malicious.
G. Reputation Algorithm
Let us now introduce the reputation model used by LVS
to rule out the reports submitted by users spoofing their
location. LVS assigns to each user ui reputation value ρmi ,
which is updated at the end of the m-th validation epoch.
In particular, the reputation ρmi of each user ui is updated
after the end of the m-th validation epoch according to the
following relation, inspired to the Jøsang reputation model
[22]:
ρmi = b
m
i − dmi − umi
where 0 ≤ ρmi , bmi , dmi , umi ≤ 1. In detail, bmi , dmi and
umi are respectively the belief, disbelief and uncertainty
level associated to the reputation of user ui after the m-th
validation epoch. These three values are updated at the end
of the m−1-th validation epoch according to Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Updating ρl
ρl = bl − dl − ul
bl + dl + ul = 1
for all u ∈ U j do
if u location is verified then
bl = bl + ∆b
ul = ul − ∆b2
dl = dl − ∆b2
else
if u location is not verified then
ul = ul + ∆u
bl = bl −∆u
end if
else
if u location is fake ∧ u is malicious then
dl = dl + ∆d
bl = bl − ∆d2
ul = ul − ∆d2
end if
end if
end for
Let us now explain the algorithm in detail. By defining
Adi as the location area advertised by user ui, the location of
user ui is verified when at the end of a validation epoch her
position has been validated by at least q users. The location
of user ui is not verified when, at the end of a validation
epoch, less than q users have validated the position of ui
to be in the location area Adl . Finally, the location of ui
is considered fake when her position has been validated by
qe users in a location area Ael 6= Adl and qe > q. The user
reputation is lowered as if her location is considered fake,
when one or more of the conditions related to the collusion
and fraud covering attacks applies.
Since the condition bl + dl + ul = 1 must always hold,
after each update the three components are normalized. We
point out that ∆b,∆d and ∆u are configurable parameters
of the LVS framework and can be varied to best fit to
different configurations with different values of Tr, emax,
user density and number of location areas.
IV. RESULTS
The target of the experimental evaluation is to evaluate
the viability of the WiFi-based approach of LVS in indoor
and outdoor scenarios, as well as its energy-efficiency.
In particular, in the following we validate the following
assumptions.
• First, some time is necessary to ensure effective WiFi
pairing between the MHS and neighbors. Moreover,
considering that smartphones are battery-powered de-
vices, it is not sound to assume that devices will have
their WiFi interfaces always active. Therefore, before
the pairing phase, it will be necessary to wait until the
WiFi interface becomes active. Such overhead must
be reasonably low with respect to the total time the
user and her MHS will be connected in the current
validation round.
• Second, supposing that a normal moving user and a
MHS are nearby when the validation protocol starts,
if the user is not in the MHS range for enough time,
the location validation will not occur.
To validate such assumptions, we performed experiments
aimed at measuring the amount of successful mutual ver-
ification between two users. The experiments have been
performed using two Galaxy Nexus 4 with Android
version 4.4. Experiments have been performed both indoor
and outdoor, with different configurations, users’ speeds,
distances and movement patterns. Specifically, in each
experiment the two users (hereafter referred to as U1 and
U2) perform the following operations. At the beginning
of each experiment, both U1 and U2 have their WiFi
interface off. As soon as the experiment starts, U1 becomes
an MHS and activates the built-in WiFi hot spot feature,
while U2 simply turns on the WiFi interface and attemps
to connect to U1. After 30 seconds from the beginning of
each experiment (i.e., Tvt = 30s), U1 and U2 shut down
their WiFi interfaces, ending the experiment. We developed
a simple Android application which implements the LVS
authentication protocol.
The indoor experiments (results summarized in Table
II) have been performed at the National Research Council
(CNR) building in Pisa, Italy. The indoor experimental
setup is depicted in the upper side of Figure 8 (reported in
the Appendix due to space limitations), with the following
configurations. Each test has been performed with the same
conditions for 15 times.
• Experiment 1 (E1). In this experiment, U1 moves on
a linear pattern while U2 stands still. The two users
are physically separated by a wall, as can be seen in
Figure 8. The experiment has been performed with U1
moving at two different speeds, namely 6 km/h and
15 km/h, to evaluate the effectiveness of LVS with
different walking speeds.
• Experiment 2 (E2). Both U1 and U2 are moving on
straight and parallel linear patterns but in opposite
directions. As shown in Figure 8, this experiment is
performed with several obstacles between U1 and U2.
The two users move on parallel trajectories which are
19,2 meters far. The presence of the obstacles and the
moving speed caused the authentication protocol to
fail 9 times on 15 for the slow speed experiments, and
11 times on 15 for the fast speed experiments.
• Experiment 3 (E3). Same configuration as E2, but
with the users moving in the same direction. The
experiment has been performed with the users moving
Fig. 8: Indoor and outdoor experimental setups.
at the same speed.
Table II concludes that if users are in the same room or
in nearby rooms, it is almost guaranteed the mutual verifi-
cation will be successful. However, walls and interference
caused by other electronic devices may affect the mutual
verification, as E2 shows. The improvement in E3 is due to
the reduction of the variance of the perceived signal strength
between U1 and U2.
The outdoor experiments (summarized in Table III) have
been performed in the premises of the National Research
Council (CNR) of Pisa, Italy (lower side of Figure 8).
Outdoor experiments differ from indoor ones for different
distances and obstacles.
In these experiments, U1 and U2 are moving on par-
allel linear trajectories in opposite directions. Overall, we
performed 5 sets of outdoor experiments, with different
distances and type of obstacles. As for indoor experiments,
each test has been performed 15 times at two different
speeds of the users, which are 6 km/h and 15 km/h. Namely,
Experiments 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 (lower side of Figure 8) have
been performed with the users moving in different aisles
of a parking lot. Each aisle is separated by two rows of
cars. Details on the distances and on the obstacles between
the users are summarized in Table III. Experiment 1.4 has
been performed at the distance of 70 meters in a condition
Energy (µAh) CI (90%) Power (mW) CI (90%) Lifetime (h) CI (90%)
LTE 5783.20 ± 524.39 399.950 ± 35.83 25.55 ± 2.22
LTE + LVS 5810.55 ± 427.56 400.15 ± 27.69 25.42 ± 2.15
WiFi + LTE 7346.11 ± 1103.2 480.490 ± 72.06 24.56 ± 6.19
TABLE I: Energy consumed by LTE only vs. LTE + LVS vs. WiFi + LTE.
Exp. Distance 6 km/h 15 km/h
1 5 m 15/15 15/15
2 19.2 m 6/15 4/15
3 19.2 m 15/15 14/15
TABLE II: Details of Indoor Experiments.
Exp. Dist. Obstacles 6 km/h 15 km/h
1.1 15 m 2 car lanes 15/15 15/15
1.2 30 m 3 car lanes 15/15 15/15
1.3 45 m 4 car lanes 15/15 15/15
1.4 70 m Partial LoS 9/15 7/15
1.5 60 m LoS 15/15 15/15
TABLE III: Details of the outdoor experiments.
of partial line of sight. Experiment 1.5 has been performed
in the central plaza of the CNR area, with the users being
in direct line of sight. From this set of experiments, we
derive that in absence of walls, with the users in line
of sight, the verification is performed always correctly if
they are within a range of 60 meters. Experimental results
conclude that the LVS approach is viable in both outdoor
and indoor environments, given the mutual authentication
occurs almost every time in every considered experimental
scenario.
A. Energy consumption evaluation
In order to calculate with high degree of precision the
energy efficiency of the LVS location verification algorithm,
we set up an experimental testbed as depicted in Figure 9.
In particular, we used the Power Monitor device [16] to
acquire instantaneous power and current consumption of
the smartphone. The tool provides a interface by which we
could also obtain an estimation of the estimated battery
lifetime of the smartphone according to the current energy
consumption rate. The measurements are then averaged
over a predefined period of time and repeated over different
experiments.
Fig. 9: Experimental setup to calculate energy consumption.
The following experiments have been performed. First,
we evaluated the energy consumption of the smartphone
while running the sensing app and LTE, with the WiFi
interface and LVS localization mechanism turned off. Next,
we calculated the energy consumption of the smartphone
when the sensing app is running, LTE is active and the LVS
localization mechanism is active, which means, the WiFi
interface is turned on for Tvt = 30 seconds for neighbor
discovery and then turned off. Finally, we evaluated the
energy consumption of the smartphone when the sensing
app is running, WiFi is active 100% of the time and
LTE is active. Table I summarizes the energy consumed,
the average power consumption and the expected residual
lifetime, supposing a battery of 2600 mAh (i.e., the one
equipped on Samsung Galaxy S4). The experiments have
been conducted by monitoring the energy consumption for
200 seconds and then averaging over different repetitions.
In all experiments, the screen was turned off and no other
apps were running on the phone; in particular, no app was
generating any downstream or upstream traffic, and WiFi
was not connected to any network.
Table I remarks the significant difference in energy
consumption between WiFi and LTE. In particular, Table
I shows a difference of almost 1600 µAh between WiFi
and LTE. This was expected, given that WiFi consumes
huge amount of energy even when not connected to a
network [23]. However, the most important result indicated
by Table I is that LVS has almost no impact on the energy
consumption of the smartphone, as WiFi is turned on only
for a short period of time (30 seconds), and then remains
turned off most of the time.
B. Simulations results
In this section, we evaluate through simulation experi-
ments the performance of LVS in terms of resilience from
attackers and efficiency. To simulate a realistic environment,
we modeled the sensing area as a single location area large
4 square kilometers (size of a small city or city block).
As far as user mobility is concerned, we assumed users
move about the location area following the Truncated Le´vi
Walk (TLW) mobility model [24], which has been shown
to best represent the mobility of humans [25]. Due to
space limitations, we refer the reader to [25] for additional
insights.
For the sake of simplicity, we modeled the WiFi range
of the smartphones devices as circles centered on the user
with radius 50 meters. As default system parameters, we
chose as reputation parameters ∆b = 0.25, ∆d = 0.6, and
∆u = 0.15. The setup time Tsw has been set to 7 seconds
according to the experimental evaluation of Section II,
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
R
e p
u t
a t
i o
n  
o f
 u
s e
r s
Validation rounds
Reputation of users x network density
50 users/sq.km.
75 users/sq.km.
100 users/sq.km.
125 users/sq.km.
Fig. 10: Reputation of users (users den-
sity).
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
50 75 100 125
A v
g .
 #
 o
f  v
e r
i f i c
a t
i o
n  
r o
u n
d s
users/sq.km.
Validation epoch duration x M
M = 90%
M = 80%
M = 70%
Fig. 11: Average time of validation
epochs.
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
R
e p
u t
a t
i o
n  
o f
 u
s e
r s
Validation rounds
Reputation of attackers x percentage of attackers
5%
10%
15%
Fig. 12: Reputation of attackers (50
users/sq.km).
while the validation round time Tvr has been set to 15s. The
validation epoch threshold M and θ have been respectively
set to 0.9 and 0.8, while the q parameter has been set to 2
in all experiments. The confidence intervals are set to 95%.
For the sake of graphical clarity, the confidence intervals
are not shown when less than 1% of the average. In the
following, we will refer to as “users” the participants not
faking their position, and to “attackers” as participants who
fake their position and implement the LSA attack described
in Section 2. For the sake of simplicity, and without losing
in generality, we also assumed that users remain active
inside the same location area for the whole duration of
a validation epoch.
First, we evaluate the impact of the user density on the
users’ reputation and the efficiency of LVS. Specifically,
Figure 10 shows the average reputation opinion of users
as function of user density, supposing no attackers are
present in the location area. As expected, from Figure
10 we observe that to greater user density corresponds
faster increase of user reputation level over time, which is
given by the faster termination of each validation epoch of
LVS. This is further validated by Figure 11, which depicts
the average duration of the validation epochs of LVS as
function of users density and the M parameter. Recall that
in LVS, a validation epoch ends when M percent of users
have their position validated by at least q users.
Figure 11 concludes the validation epoch duration de-
creases as M decreases and the users density increases,
which is coherent to what depicted in Figure 10. This
means that increasing the M parameter allows a more
complete validation of users’ location, to the expense of
longer validation epochs. This trade-off should be met by
the administrator of the PS application by considering the
average users density and the desired level of security.
As expected, it also turns out (results not shown here
for the sake of space) that the validation epoch duration
increases as the WiFi range decreases. This is reasonable,
since more time connectivity will be available to users
at each validation round. However, a shorter WiFi range
implies that the validation of users’ position will be finer-
grained. Therefore, the WiFi range parameter may be set
by the administrator of the PS application depending on the
desired trade-off between precision and efficiency of LVS.
Users x sq.km. % of MHSs C.I.
50 14.5 2.51
75 17.33 3.12
100 21.75 3.56
125 24.25 4.11
TABLE IV: Number of users selected as MHSs.
Finally, to further validate the scalability of the LVS
approach, Table reports the percentage of the users selected
as MHSs in function of the user density. Table concludes
that the percentage of users selected as MHS is significantly
less than the total number of users, even when the density
become relatively high.
1) Resilience from attackers: Let us now evaluate the
resilience of LVS to attackers with Figures 12 and 13, which
show the average reputation of all the attackers in function
of the percentage of attackers in the system. Specifically,
the attack has been simulated by setting the position of all
attackers outside the location area, and by making them
advertise a random position inside the location area to the
PS platform. We recall that we do not consider in this
analysis colluding attackers. Figures 12 and 13 conclude
that the attackers’ reputation decreases faster when the users
density is higher, due to the shorter duration of validation
rounds. Therefore, LVS is able to detect faster users not
advertising their real position when the users density is
higher. However, as anticipated earlier, note that LVS
does not increase the reputation level of attackers in any
circumstance, given the location of the attackers will never
be validated by any MHS. Also, note that the reputation
of attackers never reaches the θ threshold necessary to
accept their reports inside the PS system. Therefore, we
conclude LVS is able to exclude unreliable reports from
the PS system and therefore protects the PS system from
the location-spoofing attack defined in Section II, without
compromising the functionality of the PS application. We
would like to point out that the security parameters of the
reputation algorithm, as well as the validation round time
Tvt, may be tuned by the administrator of the PS application
according to the desired trade-off between efficiency and
security.
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To gain further insights on the impact of the attackers
on the reputation of users, Figure 14 show the reputation
of users as function of the percentage of attackers and the
users density. Figure 14 shows that when the density of
users is relatively low (50 users/sq.km.), more validation
epochs are needed to increase the reputation of users.
Simply enough, this is due to the fact that in this case the
users density on the location area becomes very low, and
therefore LVS takes additional time to validate the users’
locations. However, Figure 14 also remarks that when the
density of users is relatively high (125 users/sq.km.), LVS
is able to tolerate a very high percentage of attackers (40%)
without hindering the reputation of users. This is because
in this case LVS will still maintain enough users to validate
each user’s location and therefore will tolerate a higher
number of attackers.
V. RELATED WORK
In this section, we survey existing work related to the
localization of smartphones and users, and highlight the
novel contributions brought by this paper.
Given location-spoofing software like Fake Locator
is able to hijack both GPS and GSM location services,
approaches such the one presented in [26] are prone to
the LSA attack and therefore not suitable to validate user
location in PS systems. In addition, the user location
obtained through GSM cell triangulation is known by the
telephone service providers only, and may not be shared
with external parties due to privacy issues. Conversely, the
LVS framework does not require any piece of information
that cannot be retrieved on smartphones, which is essential
for easy deployment.
Existing WiFi-based solutions [27], [28] were specifi-
cally designed for indoor environment only, and are there-
fore not applicable to large-scale outdoor PS systems.
Instead, LVS leverages a technique that is valid for both
indoor and outdoor PS systems. Although [27], [28] and
similar solutions yield a greater accuracy than LVS, we
point out here that LVS is not aimed at calculating the pre-
cise location of users. Instead, the goal of LVS is to verify
the user location provided by other localization services
and thus solve LSA attacks. Finally, approaches based on
ambient-based fingerprints [15], [29] are not suitable in PS
scenarios in which users are not able to observe the same
phenomenon (e.g., users located in different floors/rooms
of a building). The proposed LVS framework, instead, is
independent of the collected data type and relies only
on WiFi to verify user position. A trust algorithm for
distributed environments, similar to the one proposed in this
work has been exploited in [30] to verify attribute values
in usage control systems with faulty Attribute Managers,
and in [20] where it has been exploited to manage a
collaborative framework for Android malware analysis.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed LVS, a location vali-
dation system which verifies user location in participatory
sensing (PS) systems and solves the proposed location-
spoofing attack (LSA). First, we have proposed LVS, which
authenticates user location in a distributed and scalable
way through the use of the mobile WiFi hotspot capability
of modern smartphones. Furthermore, we have introduced
the formalism of the Chains of Sight, which are used to
implement an algorithm to tackle collusion-based attacks.
We have also proposed a reputation-based system based on
LVS which rules out reports coming from users spoofing
their location. Finally, we have tested the proposed ap-
proach in indoor and outdoor testbeds, measured its energy
consumption, and shown its effectiveness against the LSA
attack through simulations. Results conclude that LVS is
energy-efficient, applicable in almost every practical PS
scenarios, and effectively solves LSA-based attacks.
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